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International Arbitration as                  
Comparative Law in Action 
Joshua Karton* 
The idea of “comparative law in action” seems nonsensical given the sterile 
and academic reputation of comparative law as a discipline.  This Article argues 
that comparative law in action does not merely exist, it thrives in the field of 
international commercial arbitration (“ICA”).  Comparative law methods pervade 
every stage of an international arbitration and are indispensable to ICA practice. 
For many aspects of international arbitral proceedings, multiple laws 
conceivably apply. With no default options, the parties must make numerous 
choices; there is “too much law.”  For other aspects of ICA, there is “too little 
law”: no applicable body of law provides any legal rule binding the parties or the 
arbitral tribunal, which must instead determine or develop the governing legal 
regime anew for each arbitration.  In both situations—too much law and too little—
comparative law methods are essential.  Moreover, even if arbitrators and counsel 
were not constrained to think comparatively, the professional context within which 
they work would ensure that comparativism remains central to ICA practice. 
The Article concludes by considering the implications of international 
arbitration as comparative law in action, for comparative law as a discipline and 
for the development of transnational law in the Twenty–First Century. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is hard to know whom to credit for the insight that “international arbitration 
is comparative law in action.”  I first heard the phrase in 2012 when I interviewed 
the late Pierre Lalive, one of the fathers of the field.1  In the interview, he attributed 
it to Lowenfeld, another leading arbitrator of the elder generation, but I have never 
been able to track down a published source.  Karrer also used the phrase in his 
treatise on international arbitration practice.2  Whatever its provenance, the concept 
stuck in my mind; it has intrigued me but also bothered me. 
 
 
*  Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Graduate Studies and Research, Queen’s University 
Faculty of Law.  I am grateful to participants in the American Society of Comparative Law Annual 
Meeting, held at the University of Missouri in October 2019, for feedback and encouragement, and to 
Professor S.I. Strong for inviting me both to present this paper at the Annual Meeting and to publish it 
in the Journal of Dispute Resolution.  I also received helpful questions and suggestions from attendees 
at the faculty workshops of the National Taiwan University and the National Chiao Tong University in 
Taiwan.  Finally, thanks are due to Gary Bell for sharing with me the text of an as–yet unpublished book 
chapter, which is cited several times below.  This Article is dedicated to my father, Michael Karton, who 
passed away when it was nearing completion.  Dad read practically everything I wrote, from kindergarten 
until an early draft of this article. 
 1. JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
CONTRACT LAW (2013) (excerpts from the interview were presented anonymously, but since Professor 
Lalive has since passed away, I feel comfortable using his name in association with this general 
observation). 
 2. PIERRE KARRER, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE 18 (2014). 
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It seems odd or incorrect to speak of comparative law in action.  Comparative 
law is not itself a field of substantive or procedural law, so it seems nonsensical to 
think of comparative law as being put into action.  When Roscoe Pound coined the 
phrase “law in action,”3 he emphasized the way law actually operates in people’s 
lives—what we would now call their lived experience of the law.  How can one 
speak of a “lived experience” of comparative law? 
In this Article, I argue that comparative law in action not only exists; it is 
thriving.  The field is international arbitration, and the experience of it—for counsel, 
arbitrators, and arbitrants—is innately and pervasively comparative.  This Article 
attempts to make three key contributions.  First, it makes a doctrinal contribution 
by charting the myriad of ways that comparative law methods are implicated in 
arbitration practice.  Second, it makes a socio–legal contribution by explaining the 
pervasiveness of comparative law methods by reference to the professional context 
within which international arbitration is practiced.  Finally, it makes a theoretical 
contribution by setting out the implications of comparative–law–in–action, both for 
comparative law as a discipline and for the evolution of transnational law. 
Before I outline this Article further, a few points must be raised about its limits.  
I will not discuss international arbitration as a subject of comparative law study.  
There is much to say about the field from a comparative perspective—comparing 
states’ legislative regimes regulating arbitrations, for example, or comparing 
arbitral processes with other forms of dispute resolution like litigation—but these 
do not concern law in action.4  I will also not discuss the uses of comparative law 
methods in drafting or reforming arbitration legislation or rules of procedure—the 
way that comparative law is most often operationalized.  In addition, I will discuss 
international commercial arbitration (“ICA”), and not investor–state arbitrations 
governed by public international law.  Many of the observations made here could 
apply to investor–state arbitrations as well,5 but the line must be drawn somewhere.  
Primarily, I will focus on comparative law methods and mentalities from an internal 
perspective, within the international arbitration system, through the life cycle of an 
international arbitral proceeding. 
Comparative law’s central role in ICA—and ICA’s value as a subject of 
comparative law study—has been recognized since the early years of the field’s 
modern development.  As David, the great French comparativist and arbitrator, 
observed in 1959, the year after the New York Convention6 was signed and the year 
it entered into force: 
 
 3. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
 4. All treatises on ICA—and most articles on specific aspects of ICA law and practice—contain a 
significant comparative element, and numerous explicitly comparative tomes exist.  See generally 
JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS, & STEFAN M. KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003); JEAN–FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 2d ed. 2007). 
 5. See, e.g., Valentina Vadi, Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment 
Treaty Arbitrations, 39 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 57, 100 (2010) (arguing that the practice of 
investment treaty arbitration involves extensive use of comparative law methods). 
 6. Formally known as the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards 1958.  The New York Convention is the key document of the modern ICA system, which it 
helped to usher in.  Its role and importance will be discussed at various points throughout this Article.  
See René David, Arbitrage et Droit Comparé, 11(1) REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 
[R.I.D.C.] 5 (1959) (Fr.) (Arbitration and Comparative Law). 
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The current spread of arbitration and the international character of its 
development give particular interest to the study of arbitration in 
comparative law.  The import of this study is at once theoretical and 
practical[:] . . . we will show, with regard to the study of arbitration, the 
truly indispensable character of comparative law studies, and [also] 
showcase the variety of potential applications of these studies.7 
As will be seen, comparativism is pervasive in international arbitrations.  
Comparative law methods are employed at every stage, even where the 
circumstances do not require a comparative analysis or assessment.  Comparative 
law goes beyond merely a method of deriving rules; it constitutes an ethos of the 
field, a core aspect of its professional culture.  That is, comparative law is not just 
something that is used in international commercial arbitrations; it is an essential 
constituent of the field.8 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts.  Sections II and III describe 
what I call the twin phenomena of too much law and too little law in ICA.  For many 
aspects of an international arbitration, a multiplicity of laws might apply, and either 
the parties or the arbitral tribunal must make a choice (and sometimes resolve 
conflicts between two or more laws that have some claim to govern the issue).  At 
the same time, a huge range of issues arises in arbitrations for which there is no 
legal rule on point, and either the parties must agree to one or the tribunal must craft 
one.  Both of these circumstances—too much law and too little—demand a 
comparative law analysis in order to identify a rule that will, in turn, determine the 
issue.  Section IV describes the professional context within which ICA is practiced 
and explains how this context embeds comparativism as a core value of ICA.  
Through self–selection and acculturation, ICA practitioners are comparativists both 
in their brains and in their hearts.  Finally, Section V, the Conclusion, briefly 
discusses the implications of international–arbitration–as–comparative–law–in–
action for the discipline of comparative law and for transnational law more 
generally. 
II.  ICA AND “TOO MUCH LAW” 
Arbitration is as old as human societies,9 and international arbitration is not 
much younger—arbitrations among the Greek city–states are described in 
 
 7. Id. at 5 (original text in French: “La diffusion actuelle de l’arbitrage et le caractère international 
que revêt le développement de cette institution donnent un intérêt particulier à l’étude de l’arbitrage en 
droit comparé.  L’intérêt de cette étude est à la fois d’ordre théorique et d’ordre pratique: nous nous 
proposons dans cette conférence de montrer, à propos de cette matière de l’arbitrage, le caractère 
vraiment indispensable des études de droit comparé, et de mettre en valeur la variété des applications 
de ces études.”). 
 8. I make no claim that the phenomenon of comparative law in action is unique to ICA.  All 
transnational legal practice necessarily involves comparativism, as Glenn notes: “For transnational legal 
practice, comparative legal thought is therefore possible.  Comparative legal practice, pace the traditional 
teachings of comparative law, therefore exists in the world.”  H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Law and 
Legal Practice: On Removing the Borders, 75 TUL. L. REV. 977, 985 (2001).  However, comparative 
law reaches its greatest practical extent in the processes and decisions of international arbitral tribunals.  
 9. Its prevalence across ancient societies is rooted in the status of “town elders” as resolvers of 
disputes from before the time humans first gathered into permanent settlements.  See David W. Rivkin, 
Towards a New Paradigm in International Arbitration: The Town Elder Model Revisited, 24 ARB. INT’L 
3
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Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War.10  International commercial 
arbitration, however, arose in the first era of globalization, before World War I, and 
did not take on its modern form until the 1950s.11  It arose as a legal response to 
social and economic globalization, generated by pressure from the business 
community for a dispute resolution method that was effective, neutral, efficient, and 
perhaps most important, globally enforceable.  Although international arbitrations 
have public consequences, like enforceability in court, ICA is a private system of 
dispute resolution.12  It is private not only in the sense that arbitrators are private 
citizens, but also in that the whole ICA system was developed, and continues to 
evolve, as an adjunct to the commercial system rather than the legal system. 
As Holtzmann, a leading figure in the rise of ICA in the mid–Twentieth 
Century, wrote: “aiding commerce is the raison d’etre of international commercial 
arbitration.”13  Lord Mustill, an English House of Lords judge and leading 
arbitrator, went a step further, stating that “[c]ommercial arbitration exists for one 
purpose only: to serve the commercial man.  If it fails in this, it is unworthy of 
serious study.”14  The entire system of arbitration therefore takes on the 
characteristics of a commercial relationship: freedom of choice, exercised to 
promote efficacy of the business deal while maintaining efficiency and 
predictability.15 
A.  Preliminary Choices 
All international commercial arbitrations begin with some kind of commercial 
relationship, normally embodied in a contract, that yields a dispute.16  The parties 
must affirmatively agree to arbitrate, either in advance in their contract or after a 
dispute arises.17  Arbitration is a creature of consent, and party autonomy is its 
 
375 (2008) (“When arbitration began, a town elder would simply listen to both sides of the dispute and 
issue his decision.”). 
 10. See W.L. Westermann, Interstate Arbitration in Antiquity, 2 THE CLASSICAL J. 197 (1907) (“Of 
recent years there has been much discussion of the history and possibilities of international arbitration.”).  
For a history of international arbitration from the middle ages to the inter–war period, see Henry S. 
Fraser, Sketch of the History of International Arbitration, 11 CORNELL L. REV. 179 (1926). 
 11. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 97–98 (2d ed. 2014). 
 12. See, e.g., W. Laurence Craig, The Arbitrator’s Mission and the Application of Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 243 (2010) (“It is a trite observation that 
arbitration is a hybrid institution.  On the one hand, its origin is contractually based on an agreement 
between the parties to appoint a third party to resolve any potential dispute between them.  On the other 
hand, the law endows the arbitrator with jurisdictional powers to give his decision the force of law and 
the attribute of enforceability before the courts, both domestically and internationally.”). 
 13. Howard M. Holtzmann, Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Modern Arbitration, 65 ARB. INT’L 
302, 302 (1999) (observing that international commercial arbitration’s commercial character is just as 
important as its international and arbitral character, but that it receives less attention). 
 14. Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty–Five Years, 4 ARB. INT’L 86, 86 
(1988), https://www.trans-lex.org/126900. 
 15. Kenneth S. Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 631, 635 
(1952) (“[A]rbitration is an allowable extension of the sphere of contract.”). 
 16. The conclusion of an international contract in itself requires a degree of not just cross–border but 
also cross–cultural exchange.  See Judd Epstein, The Use of Comparative Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration and Mediation, 75 TUL. L. REV. 913, 920–21 (2001) (“In order for a contract 
to be reached in the first instance, persons from different states and different cultures must have had 
enough in common to be able to negotiate the contract.”). 
 17. Kenneth S. Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 631, 635 
(1952) (noting that party consent has long been seen as core to arbitration). 
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watchword.18  The arbitration agreement is said to have both positive and negative 
effects.  Its positive effect is to endow the arbitrator or arbitrators—who are 
otherwise ordinary private citizens—with the power to issue a decision binding 
upon the parties, while its negative effect is to oust the jurisdiction of any state 
courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction over the dispute.19   If a dispute is 
raised in court and the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement, the 
court must dismiss the litigation, or at least stay it pending completion of the arbitral 
process.20  If there are questions about the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, the arbitrators 
themselves must have the first opportunity to rule on their own jurisdiction.21  
Thanks to the New York Convention, often called the most successful of all 
commercial law treaties, virtually every state has committed itself to these 
principles.22 
Thus, we have the first dimension of comparison: the parties must choose 
arbitration instead of litigation.23  In order to make such a choice in an informed 
manner, the parties must engage in a comparative law analysis that goes beyond 
blackletter rules to consider how litigation operates in any state whose courts might 
have jurisdiction over a dispute between them.  Some relevant considerations 
include whether the judiciary is neutral and independent, whether the procedures 
are fair to foreign litigants, how much litigation costs, and how long the process 
takes.  Given the vast impact the method of dispute resolution can have, a lawyer 
who fails to make at least a quick–and–dirty comparison of the relative merits of 
litigation and arbitration for the particular transaction fails in their duty to their 
client.24 
The arbitration may be managed only by the parties and their tribunal, which 
is called an ad hoc arbitration, but it is more common for arbitrations to be 
administered by an arbitral institution.25  These may be for–profit entities, such as 
 
 18. See the encomia to the party autonomy principle collected in KARTON, supra note 1, at 78–79. 
 19. BORN, supra note 11, at 1253. 
 20. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. II (3), June 10, 
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1958). 
 21. This is known as the competence–competence principle and is recognized in all modern arbitration 
legislation.  See, e.g., United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l 
Commercial Arbitration, art. 16., U.N. Doc. A140117 (1985) (amended 2006), 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 1985Model_arbitration_status.html. 
 22. Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 
1958) (the “New York Convention”), UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (2020), 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards/status2. 
 23. Arbitration can be combined with consensual methods of dispute resolution like mediation, but 
arbitration and litigation are mutually exclusive.  See Glenn, supra note 8, at 998 (“There is comparison 
first of all between arbitration as a process and the various national processes of litigation.”).  A vast 
body of literature exists describing when and why parties choose or ought to choose litigation or 
arbitration. 
 24. Cf. Michael Pryles, Assessing Dispute Resolution Procedures, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 267, 268 
(1996) (“Not long ago it was remarked that a lawyer may be negligent if he or she fails to advise a client 
of the possibilities of dispute resolution other than litigation.  In my view, a lawyer drafting an agreement, 
particularly an international contract, may also be derelict if he or she does not advise of the inclusion in 
the agreement of an appropriate dispute resolution provision.”); see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 64–79 (5th ed. 2016) 
(on the importance of choosing a seat and the factors that may lead parties to choose among seats). 
 25. 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements & Innovations in International Arbitration, 
QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON 17 (2015), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2
015_International_Arbitration_Survey.pdf (showing that roughly eighty percent of all international 
commercial arbitrations are administered by an institution); BORN, supra note 24, at 60 (suggesting that 
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JAMS,26 but more often they are non–profits associated with chambers of 
commerce.27  Each arbitral institution promulgates its own rules of procedure to 
govern the arbitral proceedings it administers, and each institution has other 
particular features, such as scrutiny of awards before they are sent to the parties or 
internal tribunals for resolving challenges to arbitrators for conflicts of interest.  
Parties will compare the rules promulgated by the different institutions, the services 
they provide, the administrative fees they charge, and other factors. 
If, on the other hand, the parties opt for ad hoc arbitration, so that no 
institutional rules of procedure will apply, they may choose each aspect of the 
procedural rules themselves or delegate some or all of those choices to their 
tribunal.28  Often, they will adopt a set of procedural rules promulgated by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).  The 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are specifically designed for use in ad hoc 
arbitrations.29 
All arbitrations must have a “seat.”  This is the arbitration’s legal venue, which 
need not be the place where any oral hearings are held or where the arbitrators 
deliberate.  The seat must be some legal jurisdiction, either a country or sub–
national unit.30  The courts of the seat have a range of supervisory powers over 
arbitrations conducted in the jurisdiction, most importantly the power to annul 
awards issued there (called vacatur in the U.S. and “setting aside” in many 
jurisdictions).31  In addition, the arbitration legislation of the seat, called the lex 
arbitri, applies to arbitrations seated there.  Every state (and for federal states, each 
sub–unit32) has some kind of arbitration legislation in force.  Sometimes these 
statutes apply to both domestic and international arbitrations, and sometimes 
separate legislation applies to each.  Many are verbatim adoptions of, or at least 
based on, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, an 
international uniform law that now serves as the model for legislation in eighty 
states and represents a kind of international mainstream.33  Examples of important 
 
ad hoc arbitration “ordinarily is advisable only where a dispute has already arisen and it is clear that all 
parties are prepared to proceed cooperatively with an arbitration.”). 
 26. THE JAMS NAME: WHAT DOES JAMS STAND FOR?, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-
jams-name/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) (JAMS was originally an acronym for “Judicial Arbitration and 
Mediation Services” but is now the name of the company in itself and a registered trademark). 
 27. This underlines the private, commercial character of arbitration.  KARTON, supra note 1, at 108–
09.  Dezalay and Garth observe that the location of many arbitral institutions within chambers of 
commerce means that ICA benefits from a “double sponsorship”—that of the world of business and that 
of the world of “learned jurists.”  YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER 45 (1996). 
 28. BORN, supra note 11, at 168–69. 
 29. UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (2013), https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/contractualt
exts/arbitration. 
 30. BORN, supra note 11, at 206. 
 31. Id. at 206–07. 
 32. Id. at 161.  The U.S. is an outlier among federal states for regulating international arbitration at 
the federal level.  In most other federal states in the common law world, such as Canada, Australia, and 
the U.K., arbitration (domestic and international) is regulated primarily at the sub–national level. 
 33. If one includes sub–national units, the UNCITRAL Model Law is in force in 111 jurisdictions.  
Eight U.S. states have adopted legislation based on it.  See Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with Amendments as Adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL, 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration/status (last visited Mar. 20, 
2020). 
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2020, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2020/iss2/7
No. 2] International Arbitration as Comparative Law in Action 299 
arbitration seats that have adopted the Model Law are Singapore, Germany, and 
Hong Kong.34  On the other hand, some states have enacted or maintained older 
laws that differ quite markedly from the laws of other states.  These include some 
of the most frequently chosen seats, such as England, France, and the U.S. 
In addition to the seat’s arbitration legislation, which becomes the lex arbitri 
for all arbitrations seated in that jurisdiction, other laws of the seat may also be 
relevant.  For example, each state may impose its own rules on what is generally 
called arbitrability,35 the notion that certain types of disputes may not be resolved 
by private arbitrations.36  Thus, all jurisdictions prohibit arbitration of matters 
involving core exercises of government power like criminal culpability or tax 
liability, and some jurisdictions prohibit arbitration of categories of disputes they 
reserve for the courts for cultural or policy reasons, such as divorce and custody 
disputes, consumer disputes, or intellectual property disputes.37 
Parties have near–total freedom to choose the seat of their arbitration, which 
means that they have total freedom to choose which jurisdiction’s law will become 
the lex arbitri and which jurisdiction’s courts will have the exclusive power to annul 
any award issued by the tribunal.  Parties will make a critical assessment of different 
seats, not only with regard to the features of their arbitration legislation, but also the 
efficiency and reliability of their courts, the availability of local counsel with 
expertise in international arbitration law, and any mandatory laws that might make 
an arbitral award hard to enforce in that jurisdiction—the whole legal ecosystem.38  
If the parties fail to choose a seat, either the administering institution or the tribunal 
must choose.  In practice, the tribunal will choose a seat that will vindicate the 
parties’ presumptive desire for modern, predictable laws, reliable courts, and other 
factors such as cultural affinity.39 
Although the choice of seat has important consequences, it would be wrong to 
confuse an arbitral seat with a litigation forum.  Choosing a seat determines much 
less due to the phenomenon called “delocalization.”  Unlike a court, an international 
arbitral tribunal has no lex fori, substantive or procedural.40  The civil procedure 
and court rules of the seat, or of any other national jurisdiction, are entirely 
irrelevant (unless the parties make the rare and ill–advised choice to hold their 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. This is the meaning of “arbitrability” adopted in most jurisdictions.  Confusingly, many U.S. 
courts use the term “arbitrability” to refer to any legal matter that relates to the validity of the arbitration 
agreement or jurisdiction of the tribunal, rather than to the narrower concept of suitability of the subject 
matter of the dispute for arbitration.  See, e.g., George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 10–13 (2012) (seeking to dispel the 
“serious confusion” that surrounds the term “arbitrability”). 
 36. Under Articles II(a) and V(2)(a) of the New York Convention, state courts may refuse to enforce 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards if the dispute relates to subject matter that is not “capable of 
settlement by arbitration.”  See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, supra note 20, at art. II (1). 
 37. See generally ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 4 (Loukas A. 
Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009). 
 38. As Gaillard notes, it is “no longer conceivable” for a lawyer to properly advise a client on the 
choice of seat without engaging in a comparative law analysis.  Emmanuel Gaillard, The Use of 
Comparative Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 55 ARB. 263, 263 (1989). 
 39. BORN, supra note 11, at 2100–01. 
 40. Insurer (U.S.) v. Manufacturer (Italy), Interim Award, ICC Case No. 11333 (2002), 31 Y.B. 
Comm. Arb. 117, 119–20 (2006). 
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proceedings according to some state’s civil procedure rules).41  Further, the 
governing substantive law need not be that of the seat, and hearings or deliberations 
may be held anywhere in the world.42 
B.  Choices of Law and Choices About Law 
Parties are also free to choose any substantive law to govern their dispute.  This 
is the step in the process most similar to the classical understanding of comparative 
law activities.43  The most advantageous choice of law depends on the particulars 
of the parties’ transaction and their dispute.  “For example, does it involve a contract 
for sale or for purchase?  Does the concerned party have a greater chance of finding 
himself in the position of plaintiff or defendant? . . . It is here, perhaps, where 
comparative law is potentially most useful.”44 
It must be acknowledged that, in practice, many parties do not engage in a 
detailed comparative law exercise to determine the law most suitable for their 
transaction.  Often, they default to a familiar law, either their own national law or 
one of a well–known arbitral seat.45  Nevertheless, they may, and sometimes do, 
consider all kinds of comparisons between different national laws and non–national 
rules of law. 
Moreover, the parties are free to choose a different contract law to govern their 
arbitration agreement, even if that agreement is embedded in a commercial contract 
(i.e., one law to determine the contract’s validity, the meaning of its substantive 
obligations, and to provide default rules, and another to determine the validity and 
meaning of their arbitration agreement).  Here, too, the parties must engage in some 
kind of comparative assessment to make a well–founded choice. 
If the parties do not choose a governing law, a choice must be made once the 
dispute arises—typically by the tribunal.  Until the governing law is identified, the 
parties cannot settle on their litigation strategy without conducting an in–depth 
comparative analysis.46  Moreover, unless the arbitrators render an interim decision 
specifying the governing law, the parties must continue to argue their cases 
comparatively across multiple laws up through the end of the arbitration. Writes 
Gaillard: 
 
 41. The application of domestic rules of civil procedure is strongly disfavored in ICA because they 
“have been promulgated exclusively for the regulation of litigation proceedings, reflecting features and 
objectives of the forum state.”  Soterios Loizou, Revisiting the “Content–of–Laws” Enquiry in 
International Arbitration, 78 LA. L. REV. 811, 831 (2018) (citing several commentators, who are 
unanimous on the inappropriateness of national rules of civil procedure for use in arbitrations).  See also 
KARTON, supra note 1, 140–41 (observing that party choice of national rules of civil procedure is one of 
the few circumstances where arbitrators are likely to push back against the parties’ mutually–expressed 
preference on a matter of procedure). 
 42. BORN, supra note 11, at 211. 
 43. Gary F. Bell, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 5 (Chin Leng Lim 
ed., 2020). 
 44. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 265. 
 45. Gilles Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws, 34 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455, 473–74 (2014) (surveying more than 4,400 international contracts that 
contained ICC arbitration clauses to determine which national laws contracting parties tend to prefer, 
and determining that in most cases the parties choose one of five well–established laws: those of 
England, Switzerland, New York, France, and Germany). 
 46. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 279. 
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In practice, the arbitrators are often reluctant to choose the applicable law 
in advance without first analysing the consequences this choice could have 
on the outcome of the litigation. . . .  [I]n most instances the pleadings must 
reflect all of the potentially applicable laws.47 
When the tribunal determines the governing law, this too requires a threshold 
comparative analysis.  Under most rules of procedure, arbitrators have the power to 
choose the law directly, so–called voie directe (“direct route”), without even having 
to identify a choice of law rule.48  Under other rules of procedure, arbitrators may 
select whatever they consider to be the most appropriate choice of law rule, then 
apply the law yielded by application of that rule (“indirect route”).49  Arbitrators 
will consider the consequences of different governing laws for the parties, such as 
whether the law would render the arbitration agreement invalid, thereby frustrating 
the parties’ intention to arbitrate, or whether the law is particularly well–developed 
in the relevant area, like English law with respect to shipping goods.  In addition to 
an understanding of the legal issues implicated by the dispute, comparative law 
knowledge that is both wide and deep is required to make a good decision.50 
If the parties disagree on the governing law, perhaps each arguing for 
application of its own national law, tribunals will often consider both proposed 
laws.  For example, in an arbitration between German and French parties,51 the 
tribunal held unanimously that French law governed the dispute.52  Nevertheless, it 
held that it “may not ignore the provisions of German law, as the arbitral clause was 
concluded by officers of a German company.”53  As discussed below, such 
references are best understood as a function of arbitrators’ desire to make the 
outcome acceptable to even the losing party.54  Comparative law “provides the 
means to do justice to all legal systems involved.”55 
In some cases, comparative analysis will be forced on the tribunal by the 
parties’ choice to be governed by the cumulative or concurrent application of more 
than one law.  Such a choice is sometimes the product of an awkward compromise, 
especially when state entities are involved and insist on application of their own 
laws.  In the multiparty Eurotunnel arbitration, the parties included the English and 
French governments, and the relevant choice of law provision called for cumulative 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. For example, Article 21(3) of the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce 
(the “ICC Rules”) provides that “[t]he parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied 
by the arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute.  In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral 
tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate.” 
 49. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 21, at art. 
28(2) (“Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the 
conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable.”). 
 50. See generally BENJAMIN HAYWARD, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND ARBITRAL DISCRETION 12 (2017) 
(canvassing the legal requirements and actual practices of ICA tribunals with respect to choice of the 
governing substantive law and arguing that in most cases arbitrators choose the law of the state they see 
as most closely connected to the parties and their transaction). 
 51. ICC Case No. 6850 of 1992, 23 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 37, at 78 (1998). 
 52. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See infra text accompanying notes 138–11. 
 55. Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 129, 131 (1998). 
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application of English and French law.56  Cumulative application of multiple laws 
requires tribunals to apply both laws to the extent that they coincide.  For this 
reason, cumulative application is sometimes called tronc commun, meaning the 
shared “trunk” of the laws is applied, and the areas where they branch away from 
each other disregarded.57 
The identification or selection of the governing law must be distinguished from 
the ascertainment of that law’s content.  In ordinary litigation, or even in domestic 
arbitrations, the parties may disagree on the content of the law but will at least 
follow the same means for ascertaining that law.  Namely, the sources of law 
accepted as authoritative in the jurisdiction and the prevailing rules of interpretation 
needed to apply those sources of law to the parties’ case.  In ICA, even the process 
of determining how to ascertain the content of the law is contested and uncertain.58 
In comparison with the conflict–of–laws inquiry, the content–of–laws inquiry, 
though often neglected, can be equally decisive.  Its importance is highlighted by 
an example proposed by Loizou: 
Party A and Party B entered into an international agreement for the 
distribution of heart rate monitors in Ruritania.  The distribution agreement 
contained an arbitration clause for the resolution of all disputes arising 
from or in connection with the agreement.  Following the unilateral 
termination of the contract by B, A filed a motion to initiate arbitral 
proceedings for breach of the distribution agreement.  Both A and B made 
legal submissions on contract law grounds. 
This theoretical example raises a series of content–of–laws–related 
questions: who bears the burden of establishing the content of the 
applicable rules?  Does it fall on the parties or the arbitral tribunal?  Is the 
tribunal limited by the arguments of the parties?  Should it look beyond 
the submissions of the latter?  What should the tribunal do if the parties 
have overlooked any relevant rules?  Particularly under this latter scenario, 
what is the effect of any overriding mandatory rules on goodwill indemnity 
on the law applicable to the dispute?  Depending on the approach adopted 
 
 56. The Channel Tunnel Grp. Ltd. v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, PCA 
Case No. 2003–06, ¶ 1 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 57. See generally Bernard Ancel, The Tronc Commun Doctrine: Logic and Experience in 
International Arbitration, 7 J. INT’L ARB. 3 (1990).  To fill the gaps left when the cumulatively applied 
laws do not clearly agree with each other or cannot be interpreted harmoniously, tribunals often reach 
for general principles of international commercial law.  See infra, Section III(B). 
 58. Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Ascertaining the Content of the Applicable Law in International 
Arbitration: Converging Civil and Common Law Approaches, 83 INT’L. J. ARB., MEDIATION & DISP. 
MGMT. 412 (2017) (asserting that “uncertainty reigns with respect to the limits and boundaries of 
ascertaining and applying the contents of the lex causae.”).  The best analogue in national court litigation 
to the state of affairs in ICA arises when litigation is governed by a foreign law.  State laws on proof of 
the content of foreign law vary widely and, in many jurisdictions, are as contested and uncertain as they 
are in ICA.  See, e.g., Rainer Hausmann, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law: A Comparative Analysis, 
1 EUR. LEG. FORUM I–1, I–1 (2008) (surveying the rules on pleading of proof of foreign law across 
European common and civil law jurisdictions).  In ICA, since arbitral tribunals have no lex fori, any 
governing law is “foreign.” 
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to the content–of–laws enquiry, the outcome of this dispute could vary 
significantly.59 
It is unusual for national laws to address the role of arbitrators in ascertaining 
the content of the governing law.  In a few states, though, legislation or case law 
binds tribunals seated in those jurisdictions.60  In Switzerland, for example, the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal has held that the iura novit curia principle applies to 
international arbitrations seated in Switzerland, so that tribunals have both the 
power and duty to ascertain the content of the law themselves.61  Other states’ laws 
mention the content–of–laws issue but merely flag it as something that must be 
considered.  The English Arbitration Act 1996 expressly empowers tribunals to 
determine “whether and to what extent the tribunal should itself take the initiative 
in ascertaining the facts and the law.”62  Thus, a comparative law analysis is required 
in order to determine whether the arbitrators may themselves ascertain the content 
of the law, or whether it is instead part of the parties’ evidentiary burden. 
In practice, even if the seat of arbitration mandates a iura novit curia approach, 
international arbitral proceedings often involve extensive pleadings, including 
written and oral submissions and expert reports, on the content of the governing 
law.  After all, arbitrators are frequently called upon to apply laws with which they 
are unfamiliar.  They may also lack the language skills to read that law’s sources in 
their original language, so they will depend on counsel and expert witnesses for a 
double translation, both linguistic and legal.63  Advocates and counsel must 
therefore unlearn and relearn the law.  For counsel, the situation is particularly 
fraught, as it “involves walking the tightrope between disabusing the arbitrators 
from some of their preconceived notions of the law while appealing to these very 
notions in other parts of [their] case.”64 
For this reason, far more so than in litigation, advocacy in ICA includes 
educating the arbitrators about the content of the governing law.  No less for counsel 
than for arbitrators, this is an exercise in the rhetorical deployment of comparative 
law: 
The fundamental task of counsel is to transform these divergent rules, 
which the arbitrators thus far may have had little or no exposure to, into 
something that is inherently familiar to them.  Analytically, this task breaks 
into three different components: (i) recasting rules which already seem 
 
 59. Loizou, supra note 41, at 814. 
 60. That is, if the tribunal fails to ascertain the content of the governing law in the prescribed manner, 
the award may be subject to annulment.  Abdel Wahab, supra note 58, at 414. 
 61. Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 19, 2001, 4P.114/2001, ASA Bull. 493, 510 
(Switz.).  However, if the tribunal bases its decision on a statutory provision or other source of law that 
was not raised during the proceedings nor established in the facts, it has a duty to inform the parties so 
as to permit them an opportunity to comment.  Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Jan. 17, 
20003, 4A_538/2012 (Switz.). 
 62. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 34(2)(g) (West 1996).  This flexibility is notable, given that England, 
typical of common law jurisdictions, treats foreign laws as facts—albeit “facts of a peculiar kind.”  
Parkasho v. Singh [1966] P 737 (Eng.). 
 63. Bell, supra note 43, at 11. 
 64. Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, Comparative Law as Rhetoric: An Analysis of the use of Comparative 
Law in International Arbitration, 8 PEPP. DISP. RES. J. 1, 13 (2007). 
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familiar, (ii) explaining rules that are entirely foreign, and (iii) applying 
these legal concepts to an alien business setting.65 
Thus, effective advocacy and arbitral decision–making on the merits of 
international arbitral disputes—in practice, even when not in theory—depends on 
comparative law thinking.66  Since all three members of a tribunal are unlikely to 
be of the same nationality, “the applicable law is not discussed in the abstract, but 
is more or less consciously compared with the home legal system of the 
arbitrators.”67  Advocates and arbitrators alike often analogize to laws that are more 
familiar to them, or (particularly where the governing law is underdeveloped or 
outdated) to laws from the same legal family that contain modern rules specific to 
the legal issues that arise in a given case.  Such reasoning–by–comparative–analogy 
is particularly common when the law that governs the merits is based on the legal 
system of a different state; that other state’s laws and judicial interpretations will 
prima facie be the most persuasive to the tribunal.  Of course, opposing counsel will 
have contrary arguments, themselves relying on comparative analogies, that may 
also prove persuasive.68 
Complicating this exercise is the fact that ICA tribunals commonly include at 
least one member from the jurisdiction of the governing law.  In such cases, counsel 
must balance the need to explain the content of the law in such a way as to make it 
accessible to the arbitrators who are unfamiliar with the need to use language 
“plausible within the context of the original normative discourse.”69  This 
comparative law balancing act makes advocacy on the governing law a delicate 
matter, for which both comparative law skill and ICA–specific advocacy experience 
are valuable.70 
C.  Choice of Arbitrators 
Perhaps the starkest difference between the freedom of arbitration and the 
relative rigidity of litigation is that the parties may choose their own arbitrators.  In 
most cases, the dispute will be decided by a three–member tribunal, with each party 
choosing one arbitrator and the two co–arbitrators or the administering institution 
appointing the chair.71  A huge number of factors go into the choice of arbitrator, 
but surveys confirm that one of the main ones is the arbitrator’s legal background 
and training.72 
 
 65. Id. at 13. 
 66. Id. at 1–2 (“The bulk of the comparative work of an arbitration counsel will go towards finding 
effective means of persuading a tribunal.  It is part of his advocacy tool kit.”). 
 67. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 265. 
 68. S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 2 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 119, 147–48 (2009). 
 69. Sourgens, supra note 64, at 16. 
 70. Strong, supra note 68, at 147–48. 
 71. BORN, supra note 11, 1069–70. 
 72. Specifically, expertise in the governing law was the sixth–most–mentioned factor influencing 
parties’ choice of arbitrator.  2010 International Arbitration Survey: Choices in International 
Arbitration, QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON 30 (2010), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbi
tration/docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf. 
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Most obviously, parties will consider whether the arbitrator is qualified in the 
governing law, or at least able to make themselves sufficiently familiar with it.73  
But a range of other factors relating to the arbitrators’ legal background apply.  Are 
they a civil lawyer who can be expected to rely on notions of good faith?  Or an 
American litigator or English barrister who might take a more literal approach to 
interpreting the contract and assessing compliance?  Do they have training and 
expertise in the governing substantive law, or similar laws?  Are they from a country 
with a tradition of judicial mediation, and so might be expected to push the parties 
to settle?  What a party wants will depend on the particulars of their case, so the 
choice must be made anew for each arbitration.  These choices require a subtle 
understanding of varying legal cultures and their likely impacts on a prospective 
arbitrator’s management of the proceedings and decision on the merits. 
With respect to the choice of party–appointed arbitrators specifically, arbitrants 
unsurprisingly seek advantage.  As Hunter famously put it, “When I am 
representing a client in arbitration, what I am really looking for in a party–
nominated arbitrator is someone with the maximum predisposition towards my 
client, but with the minimum appearance of bias.”74  In particular, parties often seek 
as their party–appointed arbitrator a compatriot who will be familiar with the party’s 
national customs, language, business practices, and laws.  Their appointed arbitrator 
can act as a “legal translator” to ensure that all members of the tribunal, even those 
who do not share the nationality of the appointing party, at least understand its 
perspective.75 
D.  Choices in the Final Stages of                                                                
an Arbitration 
At the end of the process, if the losing party does not pay up, the winner must 
move to enforce the arbitrators’ award.  This, too, is governed by the New York 
Convention, which requires all signatory countries—nearly 160 of them—to 
enforce the award subject only to narrow exceptions unrelated to the arbitrators’ 
decision on the merits (primarily defects in jurisdiction and procedure).  To a large 
extent, the choice of where to seek enforcement is driven by the fact that one has to 
go where the losing party’s assets are located.  If those assets can be found in more 
than one jurisdiction, however, prevailing parties will compare the procedural ease 
of enforcement across the different jurisdictions, including not only statutes and 
case law, but also whether the courts are corrupt or xenophobic (e.g., whether they 
exploit the public policy exception to enforcement in Article V of the New York 
Convention to avoid enforcing awards against local firms). 
The party that loses the arbitration also has a tactical decision to make, which 
again must be informed by comparative analysis.  An award may be 
 
 73. As Bell notes, “[t]he choice of arbitrators is not an exercise in comparative law but [it is] an 
exercise in comparative qualifications for the comparative law work the tribunal will need to undertake.”  
Bell, supra note 43, at 7. 
 74. Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 53 ARB. 219, 223 (1987). 
 75. See also the separate opinion of Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, sitting as judge of the ICJ in Application 
of Genocide Convention (Separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J.), 1986 I.C.J. 408, 409 ¶ 6 (Feb. 19) 
(arguing that the institution of the ad hoc judge at the International Court of Justice, which permits a 
disputing state that has none of its nationals sitting on the court to appoint a judge ad hoc, serves a similar 
function). 
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annulled/vacated/set aside in the seat of arbitration, rendering it a dead letter in most 
cases.76  Alternatively, the losing party can wait until the winning side seeks to 
enforce the award and then resist enforcement in the jurisdiction(s) where it is 
sought.77  Although such a choice involves pragmatic considerations, such as where 
the assets of the party resisting enforcement are located, it is also—you guessed it—
an exercise in comparative law.  A party seeking to resist enforcement must make 
a holistic assessment of the odds that an award will be annulled in the seat, based 
on its legislation, case law, and court practices, as compared with the prospects for 
enforcement of the award elsewhere.  As for the prevailing party, this includes not 
only a comparison of law on the books on matters such as arbitrability and public 
policy,78 but also an assessment of the cost and time required to enforce the award 
in the jurisdictions where the losing party’s assets are located. 
Working backward, when arbitrators make procedural decisions during the 
arbitration, they have a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure the enforceability of 
an eventual award.79  This requires an understanding of the potential hurdles to 
enforceability in several jurisdictions including, at a minimum, the seat of 
arbitration where the award could be annulled and other jurisdictions where 
enforcement might reasonably be sought (such as the home jurisdictions of the 
parties and other jurisdictions where they have major operations or assets). 
Often, arbitration legislation and other statutes relevant to enforceability are 
based on an international uniform law instrument like the New York Convention 
itself, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, or 
other instruments of more specific scope.  As comparativists know well, courts 
interpreting such uniform law instruments should have regard to the ways that 
courts in other jurisdictions that have adopted the same instrument have interpreted 
 
 76. The New York Convention, Article V(1)(d), provides only that an award “may” be refused 
enforcement on the ground that it has been annulled in the seat.  Most jurisdictions, including those that 
have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, will normally refuse to enforce an award that has been 
annulled.  Nevertheless, a minority of jurisdictions, most notably France, take the position that annulment 
of an award by the courts of the seat only binds subsequent courts of the same jurisdiction, so that the 
award could still be enforced elsewhere.  BORN, supra note 11, at 3625–29.  U.S. courts will generally 
refuse to enforce awards annulled in their state of origin but have recognized narrow circumstances 
where enforcement is justified.  The best–known such case is Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic 
of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996), in which a U.S. court enforced an award annulled by the 
courts in Egypt, the seat of arbitration, on the basis that the annulment violated a fundamental public 
policy of the U.S. against substantive review of arbitral awards by courts, and that the parties had 
expressly waived resort to judicial review.  While the case law is somewhat inconsistent, the trend is 
toward recognizing annulments of awards as precluding enforcement.  A prominent recent case in this 
vein is Thai–Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 864 
F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 77. Under the New York Convention, the party opposing enforcement has the onus to demonstrate 
one of the grounds for non–enforcement under Article V(1), unless the award deals with a non–arbitrable 
issue or enforcement would violate the public policy of the enforcing state (Art. V(2)(b)).  Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 20, at art. V(1)–(2). 
 78. Id. at art. V(2); see also UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra 
note 21, art. 34(2)(b). 
 79. To be sure, this is a duty of best efforts, not an inexorable command, since awards will sometimes 
be rendered unenforceable for reasons out of the tribunal’s control.  Nevertheless, several institutional 
rules of procedure mention this obligation.  For example, Art. 42 of the ICC Rules provides that the 
tribunal “shall make every effort to ensure that the award is enforceable at law.”  ICC 2017 ARBITRATION 
RULES, art. 4 (2017), https://iccwbo.org/publication/arbitration-rules-and-mediation-rules/. 
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it, so as to promote uniformity of interpretation.80  In fact, the most recent version 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, in Article 2A, explicitly requires this.  Thus, when 
an arbitration is seated in a Model Law jurisdiction, counsel and members of the 
tribunal must consider not only how the courts of the seat have interpreted their 
arbitration statute, but also how the courts of other Model Law jurisdictions have 
interpreted the same provisions. 
E.  Arbitration à la Carte 
What this review shows is that throughout each arbitration, at every stage, there 
is a radical availability of choice for the parties.  Laws and jurisdictions are an á la 
carte menu from which the parties may mix and match at will.  Taken together, this 
is the “too much law” phenomenon in ICA: many choices, no defaults.  Indeed, 
there are now so many choices available on so many issues that no individual, no 
matter how well–schooled and well–prepared, can possibly take stock of all them.81  
This has, in practice, led to reliance on the numerous comparative guides that have 
been published with respect to each of the choices described above. 
The “too much law” phenomenon means that choice is forced upon the parties 
or, if they decline to choose, upon the tribunal.  Unless counsel or arbitrators are 
entirely derelict in their duty, they will have to engage in a series of careful, 
informed comparative law analyses throughout the proceedings.  By putting choice 
front–and–center at every stage of the proceedings, ICA compels participants to 
think constantly about legal difference, to make comparisons, and to consider which 
rules are most appropriate for their particular circumstances or which they can 
accept given their legal and cultural background.82 
III.  ICA and “Too Little Law” 
Coexisting with the overabundance of law at many stages of an international 
arbitration, important areas exist where there is too little law.  A huge number of 
procedural and substantive matters are simply undetermined and must be chosen or 
designed ad hoc for the proceeding.  Will there be a hearing?  If so, will there be 
witnesses?  If so, will they be directly examined live in the hearing?  Cross–
examined?  What categories of evidence are admissible?  What will be the scope of 
discovery?  What documents are privileged?  How will expert evidence be 
introduced?  How, if at all, will the costs of the proceedings be allocated among the 
parties?  What rate of interest will be assessed on the damages, pre–judgment and 
post–judgment?  On all of these matters, there is simply no rule, or else the 
 
 80. See, e.g., Frédéric Bachand, Court Intervention in International Arbitration: The Case for 
Compulsory Judicial Internationalism, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 88 (2012) (arguing that even courts in 
non–Model Law jurisdictions called upon to implement the New York Convention must consider the 
“international normative consensus” because the New York Convention “unquestionably rests on the 
idea that limiting the influence of domestic rules by subjecting the international arbitration system to 
international rules tends to serve the needs of its users.”). 
 81. Bell, supra note 43, at 2. 
 82. It is worth noting that these kinds of exercises resemble discussions about whether and why a 
proposed legal transplant across national systems will succeed; in this, comparative law in action shows 
its close relationship with more traditional comparative law activities, such as law reform.  For a look at 
the different functions of comparative law analysis, see Jürgen Basedow, Comparative Law and its 
Clients, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 821 (2014) (categorizing various “clienteles” of comparative law). 
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governing rules give complete discretion to the parties to make a choice, with the 
choice falling to the tribunal when the parties do not agree.  If the tribunal is to 
avoid rank arbitrariness, it must identify some applicable rule. 
A.  Choice of Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
Matters of procedure and evidence are prima facie governed by the rules of 
procedure chosen by the parties to govern their dispute, usually the rules of the 
administering institution.  These rules are, however, written to give maximum 
latitude to the parties and the tribunal.  They are so sparse with respect to matters 
of evidence that litigators unfamiliar with ICA find themselves disoriented and even 
offended by the lack of guidance.83  For example, most institutional rules of 
procedure say nothing whatsoever about the admissibility of evidence, except to 
empower the tribunal to decide matters of admissibility.84  On questions of 
evidence, as with many aspects of arbitral procedure, the institutional rules are no 
more than a guide.  The tribunal and parties, usually working collaboratively, must 
design a bespoke procedural regime for each individual arbitration.85 
How are such matters determined in practice?  Mostly by comparative analysis.  
As noted in the previous Section, the tribunal will likely be composed of arbitrators 
from different jurisdictions, and the parties by definition come from different 
jurisdictions since we are speaking of international arbitration.  Unsurprisingly, they 
typically take their cues from the legal systems with which they are familiar, then 
consider which of these options would be most appropriate for the case.86  Czech 
writes: 
Some arbitration enthusiasts can cast around for the “harmonization” of 
international arbitration through the process of reaching subtle procedural 
compromises in a given case—usually at its early stage or subsequent 
procedural conferences—which participants can adopt certain practices, 
patterns and habits directly or indirectly from one’s legal culture, and even 
exactly from their home countries, or adopt patterns from more 
supranational sources such as different notes, guidelines, and protocols.87 
In some areas, they are assisted by soft law instruments promulgated by ICA 
institutions.  On evidentiary matters, the best known such document is the 
International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International 
Arbitration, drafted by the arbitration committee of the International Bar 
 
 83. For a list highlighting the extraordinary range of evidentiary matters on which the parties have 
free choice to select a rule, see François Ruhlmann & Olivier Gutkes, The Absence of Specific Rules of 
Evidence in International Arbitrations: Desirable Remedies, 4 INT’L BUS. L.J. 437, 447–49 (1995). 
 84. A representative example is UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules, art. 27(4), the only provision 
governing the admission of evidence in the UNCITRAL Rules, which states only that “[t]he arbitral 
tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence offered.”  
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 29, art. 27(4). 
 85. Epstein, supra note 16, at 917. 
 86. Id. at 916. 
 87. Konrad Czech, The Distinctive Characteristics of Commercial and Investment Arbitration 
Proceedings: Lex Multiplex, Universita Curiositas, Ius Unum, 35 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 293, 296 (2015). 
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Association ( “IBA Rules”).88  Documents like the IBA Rules often function in 
practice like international uniform laws for ICA, so widely are they adopted 
(although, as in everything else, the parties may agree to exclude their 
application).89 
There is a strong universalizing impulse within international arbitration, since 
legal uncertainty imposes significant costs on commercial parties.  Why should an 
arbitration conducted in one seat by one tribunal operate under different rules of 
evidentiary privilege than an arbitration between the same two parties conducted by 
a different tribunal seated in a different jurisdiction?  Given the enormous number 
of permutations, this way lies madness.  The profound differences between different 
legal systems’ approaches to procedure and evidence also create a risk of unfairness 
when one, but not both, parties are forced to proceed according to rules they find 
unfamiliar and possibly peculiar.90 
Soft law instruments like the IBA Rules represent a response to the risk to the 
legitimacy and popularity of ICA posed by the diversity of procedural approaches 
taken by different national jurisdictions.  They were all drafted by committees 
composed of experienced arbitration lawyers from a range of jurisdictions, and all 
represent something of a compromise between, or hybrid of, common law and civil 
law approaches, with comparative analysis again lying at the heart of the 
endeavor.91  For example, the IBA Rules tried to find a compromise between civil 
law and common law procedure by allowing the production of documents (i.e., 
discovery), as is the case in common law jurisdictions,92 but prescribing a much 
more limited scope than is permitted in U.S. civil procedure.93  This was explicitly 
intended as a compromise with the civil law, which permits only very limited 
document discovery.94  The same is often true of institutional rules of procedure.  
While some institutional rules wear their common law or civil law origins on their 
sleeves,95 most rules attempt to strike a compromise between (or develop a hybrid 
of) civil and common law procedure.96 
 
 88. IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, INT’L BAR ASS’N (2010), 
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=68336C49-4106-46BF-A1C6-
A8F0880444DC [hereinafter IBA Rules]. 
 89. According to a 2012 survey, the IBA Rules were used as guidelines in fifty–three percent of cases 
and as binding rules (as agreed by the parties) in seven percent of cases, for an overall penetration of 
sixty percent.  2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral 
Process, QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON 11 (2012), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitrati
on/docs/2012_International_Arbitration_Survey.pdf. 
 90. Ruhlmann & Gutkes, supra note 83, at 438. 
 91. Gómez–Palacio and Epps vividly described the common law and civil law in ICA as “two cultures 
in a state of courtship and potential marriage of convenience.”  Cf. Ignacio Gómez–Palacio & Garrett 
Epps, International Commercial Arbitration: Two Cultures in a State of Courtship and Potential 
Marriage of Convenience, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 235 (2009). 
 92. IBA Rules, supra note 88, at art. 3(2). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at art. 3(3)(a) (requiring the party to provide “a description of each requested Document 
sufficient to identify it, or . . . a description in sufficient detail (including subject matter) of a narrow and 
specific requested category of Documents that are reasonably believed to exist.”).  
 95. For example, the ICC Terms of Reference are clearly of civil law origin.  See, e.g., ICC 2017 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 79, at art. 23. 
 96. For a list of the differences in procedure between civil and common law, see Urs Martin Laeuchli, 
Civil and Common Law: Contrast and Synthesis in International Arbitration, in ICDR HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION & ADR (International Center for Dispute Resolution ed., 3d ed. 2017). 
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Despite their attempt to balance common law and civil law traditions, the IBA 
Rules have been criticized for taking too much of a “common law approach,” 
usually meaning broad, American–style document discovery, which non–American 
parties prefer to avoid.  The IBA Rules have now attracted a competitor, the Rules 
on the Efficient Conduct of Proceedings in International Arbitration (“Prague 
Rules”),97 which adopt a more continental European approach to evidence–taking 
and thereby purport to yield quicker, cheaper proceedings.98  The Prague Rules 
discourage extensive document discovery99 and encourage the tribunal to examine 
witnesses itself and manage examination of witnesses by counsel.100  I take no 
position here on the relative merits of the IBA Rules and Prague Rules; the salient 
point is that the Prague Rules represent another choice on the legal menu, and yet 
another comparison for parties and tribunals to make.  In a recapitulation of the “too 
much law” phenomenon within the “too little law” context of evidentiary rules in 
ICA, the simple existence of an alternative to the IBA Rules encourages the parties 
to consider the different ways that they could proceed, compelling them to think 
comparatively. 
The dearth of procedural law is a feature of ICA, not a bug.  The absence of 
rigid rules of procedure, in particular, is seen as a way to tailor each arbitration to 
the particularities of the dispute: the nationality of the parties and the arbitrators, 
the various legal systems whose rules of public policy may have some bearing on 
the case, the subject matter of the litigation, the seat of arbitration, and the place 
where an award may be enforced.  The parties or the arbitrators may choose or 
design rules suitable to the individual dispute.101  This flexibility is particularly 
valuable for preserving the legitimacy of arbitration among parties who, due to their 
different national legal traditions, have very different conceptions of what a fair 
process looks like.102  Such buy–in is enhanced when the tribunal can show that it 
appreciates those different conceptions and delivers a procedure recognized as fair 
by parties with widely varying expectations.  Comparative law is the means by 
which such procedures are identified. 
B.  Choices of Substantive Law that Call for                                       
Further Comparative Analysis 
The too little law phenomenon can also extend to the substantive law governing 
the merits of the dispute.  It arises in three areas: the application of non–national 
rules of law, the application of national laws that are underdeveloped or outdated 
(and therefore contain important gaps or provide rules unsuited to modern 
 
 97. See Rules on the Efficient Conduct of Proceedings in International Arbitration (Prague Rules), 
PRAGUE RULES (Sept. 22, 2019), https://praguerules.com/upload/medialibrary/9dc/9dc31ba7799e26473
d92961d926948c9.pdf [hereinafter Prague Rules]. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at art. 4.2. 
 100. Id. at art. 5.9. 
 101. Ruhlmann & Gutkes, supra note 83, at 444. 
 102. See, e.g., René David, The Methods of Unification, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 13, 13–27 (1968) (arguing 
that for ICA, it is most appropriate to leave the arbitrators as much latitude as possible to take account 
of the differing conceptions of the parties coming from different countries as to the rules to be observed 
for the administration of justice). 
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commercial disputes), and the cumulative or concurrent application of multiple 
laws. 
Parties to contracts that will be resolved by arbitration have the freedom to 
choose not only national laws but also “rules of law,” a term of art in ICA referring 
to bodies of substantive rules that are not the law of any state.  Such rules of law 
may be found in “codified” soft law instruments, most notably the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts.103  Alternatively, parties may 
choose to be governed by lex mercatoria, or “general principles of international 
commercial law.”  They may choose expressly to be governed by no law at all, as 
happened in a notorious arbitration between Arthur Andersen Consulting (now 
Accenture) and Arthur Andersen Accounting (now defunct).104  To resolve cases 
governed by rules of law, tribunals must identify the content of those rules.105  In 
the case of the codified instruments, this task may appear easy, but instruments like 
the UNIDROIT Principles, which are thoroughly drafted in the areas they cover, do 
not even purport to govern all aspects of a commercial relationship.  Accordingly, 
they frequently require supplementation. 
The second scenario involving governing rules of law involves cases decided 
according to general principles of law or lex mercatoria.  These concepts, 
synonymous as generally construed, refer to a purported global law of commerce, 
detached from national laws and arising from the usages of commercial parties 
engaged in international commerce.106  They are notoriously vague and grant 
arbitrators very wide discretion to identify the content of the relevant substantive 
rules.  Lex mercatoria is closely associated with ICA.  In fact, it is almost purely a 
phenomenon of international arbitration, and to the extent it can be identified, it will 
be through the published decisions of ICA tribunals. 
In some cases, tribunals take it upon themselves to apply lex mercatoria, either 
to fill gaps in the governing law or as itself the governing rules of law, on the theory 
that the parties, simply by choosing international arbitration, want their dispute to 
be governed by non–national, “truly global” rules.  Lex mercatoria is thus the 
apotheosis of delocalization, the autonomy from local courts and laws that remains 
a normative commitment of the ICA field.107  The normative dimension of 
delocalization—the fact that it is not simply a response to consumer demand for 
globally enforceable awards—can be seen in the rhetoric often adopted by ICA 
practitioners and scholars, which consistently glorifies the international 
 
 103. The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UPICC), UNIDROIT (Feb. 
26, 2020), https://www.unidroit.org/contracts#UPICC. 
 104. Andersen Consulting Bus. Unit Member Firms vs. Arthur Andersen Bus. Unit Member Firms & 
Andersen Worldwide Societe Coop., ICC Int’l Court of Arbitration (2000) (note that the tribunal decided 
to apply the UNIDROIT Principles). 
 105. I exclude, for the purposes of this Article, the possibility of amiable composition (also called 
decision ex aequo et bono), under which arbitrators are empowered to decide according to their own 
sense of fairness, without a requirement that the decision be justified in any legal manner, and thus 
without involvement of any “rules of law.”  Amiable composition is contemplated by most arbitration 
laws and rules of procedure but is marginal in practice. 
 106. Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 369, 371 
(2014). 
 107. As Michaels describes it, much ICA literature is utopian in character, “dreaming” of a law that 
exists beyond the state.  Ralf Michaels, Dreaming Law Without a State: Scholarship on Autonomous 
International Arbitration as Utopian Literature, 1 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 35 (2013). 
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(characterized as modern and pragmatic) over the national (characterized as old–
fashioned and dogmatic).108 
At the same time, lex mercatoria is controversial; many see it as a fig leaf for 
arbitrariness, especially where well–fed arbitrators from Western Europe or North 
America justify its application on the basis of the “inadequacy” of a developing 
state’s law that the parties have chosen to govern their contract.  Parties expressly 
choose lex mercatoria very rarely, mostly due to its obvious unpredictability, 
rendering lex mercatoria of more theoretical than practical interest.109  
Nevertheless, lex mercatoria continues to generate interest and attention, which is 
likely due to the fact that many arbitrators remain devoted to it as a truly 
autonomous commercial law, free from the peculiarities of different national laws 
and particularly adapted to the needs of the global commercial community. 
One influential conception of lex mercatoria was developed by Gaillard, the 
French scholar and arbitrator who is its best–known proponent.  Gaillard argues that 
lex mercatoria is not a set of rules at all, but rather a method of decision–making.110  
When drafting awards in arbitrations governed by lex mercatoria, arbitrators should 
conduct a comparative analysis to assess how the majority of national laws govern 
each particular issue that arises, and then apply the most widely–accepted solution 
on the basis that any rule common to most national legal orders would be acceptable 
(or at least unsurprising) to commercial parties.111  Thus, for Gaillard, decision 
according to lex mercatoria does not involve comparative methodology, but is itself 
a concrete expression of comparative methodology.112 
Although others reject Gaillard’s position, the various theories of lex 
mercatoria all acknowledge a central role for comparative analysis in identifying 
individual lex mercatoria principles.113  If taken seriously, this is an arduous task 
requiring “knowledge of a large number of legal systems, a qualification that most 
practitioners who act as arbitrators lack.  This probably explains why arbitrators 
limit themselves to citing a few sources of inspiration rather than undertaking a 
comprehensive comparative analysis.”114  They are aided by more thorough 
comparisons produced by large research teams, such as the TransLex–Principles, a 
compilation of lex mercatoria rules produced by the Center for Transnational Law 
(“CENTRAL”) at the University of Cologne.115  The drafters of the TransLex–
Principles claim to justify each principle they identify as being a rule of lex 
mercatoria with “comprehensive comparative references taken from international 
arbitral awards, domestic statutes and court decisions, international conventions, 
soft law instruments including international restatements of contract law, standard 
contract forms and contract clauses taken from international one–off contracts, trade 
 
 108. See infra text accompanying notes 123–34. 
 109. KARTON, supra note 1, at 46. 
 110. Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision Making?, 17 
ARB. INT’L 59, 62 (2001). 
 111. Emmanuel Gaillard, Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Selective Application of 
Transnational Rules, 10 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 208, 210–11 (1995). 
 112. Id. at 211. 
 113. See generally Cuniberti, supra note 106, at 383. 
 114. DOLORES BENTOLILA, ARBITRATORS AS LAWMAKERS 95 (2017). 
 115. See generally Center. for Transnational Law, UNIV. OF COLOGNE, https://www.trans-lex.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2020). 
20
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2020, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2020/iss2/7
No. 2] International Arbitration as Comparative Law in Action 313 
practices and usages, and academic sources.”116  This wide scope of comparison—
which encompasses a range of sources both public and private, soft law, and hard 
law—is consistent with the private and transnational character of lex mercatoria.  
After all, as Gaillard observes, “The object of comparative law is to transcend the 
peculiarities of a single legal system, and it is understandable that one would 
naturally turn to comparative law to do so.”117 
Even where state law applies to the merits of a dispute, that choice may require 
tribunals to engage in further analysis that goes beyond the boundaries of that state’s 
law.  This arises in two circumstances.  First, the parties may choose a law that 
contains no rule that would help decide issues that arise in the dispute. This usually 
arises when the chosen law is outdated or underdeveloped.  Second, they may 
choose to be governed cumulatively by the law of two states, and an issue arises in 
the arbitration on which the two states’ laws differ and cannot be reconciled.118 
In both of these circumstances, arbitral tribunals are faced with situations where 
there is no rule that would dictate an outcome—a problem of too little law.  What 
can they do to avoid arbitrariness?  Almost invariably, they apply a comparative 
analysis.  For example, when dealing with a governing law that contains no rule on 
point, they may consider the laws of both parties’ home countries, or of past colonial 
powers that influenced their laws, on the theory that such an analysis will yield a 
rule that comports best with the parties’ presumptive intentions or reasonable 
expectations.  They may consider whether there is convergence on the issue among 
developed legal systems, perhaps even a sufficiently robust consensus to constitute 
a matter of international public policy.119  They may look to various national models 
to determine which rule is best suited to particular legal issues that arise in the 
case.120  And they may refer to lex mercatoria or general principles as an expression 
of global rules of law particularly adapted for cross–border commerce.121  All of 
these different means of determining a rule, whether they involve supplementing or 
improving state law or working beyond it, are methodologically comparative.122 
C.  The Comparative Law Toolkit 
In contrast to situations of too much law, the too little law phenomenon does 
not actually force parties and arbitrators to engage in comparative analyses.  
Nevertheless, comparativism reigns all the same.  To find rules in areas where there 
are none, and to operationalize the deliberately vague rules of procedure that govern 
arbitration proceedings, arbitrators and counsel reach for comparative law methods. 
 
 116. Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex Mercatoria (Old and New) and the TransLex–Principles, ¶ 68, 
https://www.trans-lex.org/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (provision of such comparative sources is intended 
to help parties and tribunals “save time and money that must be invested in comparative research required 
to determine the contents of transnational law.”). 
 117. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 280. 
 118. On the cumulative application of national laws, see UNICITRAL, supra note 49; Hayward, supra 
note 50. 
 119. Emmanuel Gaillard, Du bon Usage du Droit Comparé dans l’Arbitrage International, 2005 R. DE 
L’ARBITRAGE 375, 383 (2005) (Fr.) (The Proper use of Comparative Law in International Arbitration). 
 120. Id. at 380. 
 121. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 279 (“Arbitrators additionally will prefer to have recourse to the general 
principles of law where it is difficult to determine the applicable law because the controversy is linked 
to many different countries and legal systems.”). 
 122. Glenn, supra note 8, at 995. 
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Comparativist ways of thinking about law also inform the drafting of many 
bodies of procedural rules, in particular soft law instruments like the IBA Rules on 
the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitrations.  These instruments were all 
drafted by legally diverse123 committees of lawyers under explicit mandates to 
develop sets of uniform rules that promote efficient resolution of disputes yet are 
simultaneously acceptable to counsel and parties from a wide variety of 
backgrounds.124  Equally, comparative methods inform the agreements of parties 
and the procedural decisions of arbitral tribunals in individual arbitrations. 
Comparative law is a vital part of counsel’s advocacy toolkit because it is a 
necessary part of tribunals’ decision–making toolkit. 
The same practices can also be seen in the development of substantive law 
through the decisions of ICA tribunals.  Just as arbitrators fill gaps in the procedural 
rules by reference to comparative analogies, they also fill gaps in governing laws.  
General principles of international commercial law (lex mercatoria) are defined 
through comparative exercises and deployed to supplement or update governing 
national laws and to provide substantive rules in cases where national laws do not 
apply. 
In short, wherever the governing law or rules of law do not dictate a particular 
result or approach, ICA looks to provide rules that are effective, non–arbitrary, 
predictable, and acceptable to the parties regardless of their origins.  Tribunals 
identify those rules by means of comparative analysis. 
IV.  THE PROFESSIONAL CONTEXT OF                                                                  
ICA PRACTICE 
A purely doctrinal analysis cannot account for all the features of the ICA 
system described in the previous Sections.  In this Section, I will outline some of 
the ways in which ICA practice is experienced by practitioners and explain how 
that professional context embeds comparative law methods and comparativist 
thinking into the field.  After all, “[c]omparative legal practice . . . involves more . 
. . than the simple movement of legal ideas.  It also involves, and flows from, the 
movement of people.”125 
Given the potentially vast scope of such a socio–legal inquiry, what follows is 
merely a sketch.  However, in addition to drawing on the existing socio–legal 
literature on ICA, this sketch provides some corroboration from a new empirical 
study. 
A.  International Arbitration as a Crossroads                                             
of Laws and Lawyers126 
The ICA system is radically decentralized.  There is no central institution, nor 
is there any comprehensive legal instrument.  The closest candidate, the New York 
Convention, deals only with a few (albeit some of the most important) matters and 
 
 123. That is, the committees are diverse in the sense that their membership represents a variety of legal 
systems.  They are composed entirely of business lawyers, mostly white men from developed countries. 
 124. Holtzmann, supra note 13, at 302. 
 125. Glenn, supra note 8, at 989. 
 126. Cf. Ruhlmann & Gutkes, supra note 83, at 439. 
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leaves many frequently–arising issues to be determined by national law.127  Instead, 
a kind of glorious cacophony reigns, with numerous states, private and public 
arbitral institutions and rulemaking bodies, and individual arbitrators and law firms 
jockeying for attention and market share.  At the level of each individual arbitration, 
the same applies, with lawyers from the full global variety of backgrounds working 
together case–by–case and institution–by–institution.128  International arbitration is 
“a place of convergence and interchange.”129 
This pluralism recapitulates the structures and reflects the ideals of the 
commercial community, which disdains government intervention and thrives on 
flexibility.  After all, one of the most important aspects of arbitration is that it means 
freedom from courts.  In such a context, a range of options must always be made 
available, which means that comparisons—and perhaps compromises—will always 
have to be made. 
The micro–level equivalent of this macro–level phenomenon is the radical 
pluralism exhibited within individual arbitrations.  Members of a tribunal will 
usually have received their training and built up their experience in different legal 
systems from each other and from the parties.  To persuade such heterogeneous 
tribunals, parties must pitch their arguments in such a way as to appeal to arbitrators 
with diverse backgrounds.  Most prominently, this includes the explicitly 
comparative advocacy discussed above, whereby parties will explain unfamiliar 
governing laws in terms of laws with which the arbitrators may have more 
experience.130   
Advocacy in other areas also involves explicit comparisons, especially in those 
aspects of arbitrations where there is too little law.  Tribunals tend to reach for 
international or harmonized solutions, so parties often try to persuade a tribunal to 
adopt their preferred solution by arguing that it is representative of an international 
mainstream or modern trend.  Such an argument can only be supported with a 
comparative analysis, across jurisdictions and across eras. 
Within tribunals, there are strong pressures to achieve unanimity, so arbitrators 
will have to find solutions among themselves that are acceptable to lawyers with 
different perspectives.131  In this process, party–appointed arbitrators may see it as 
 
 127. Most notably, under the New York Convention, national law governs the scope of public policy 
that would prevent enforcement of an award and the rules on arbitrability.  Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 20, at art. V(2)(b).  The procedures 
for enforcing foreign awards are also left up to national law, so long as the state does not impose 
“substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges” on foreign arbitral awards than it 
imposes on domestic awards.  Id. at art. III. 
 128. It must be acknowledged that practitioners from a relatively small number of developed states 
continue to dominate, especially when one includes lawyers from developing countries who pursued 
graduate training in the Global North and/or developed their professional skills in an Anglo–American 
law firm.  IBA Arb. 40 Subcommittee, The  Current State  &  Future  of  International  Arbitration: 
Regional Perspectives, INT’L BAR ASS’N (2015) (available for download at 
https://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Arbitration/Publications.aspx). 
 129. See Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1335 (2003). 
 130. See Permanent Court of Advocacy, supra note 56; Ancel, supra note 57; Abdel Wahab, supra note 
58; Loizou, supra note 41; Swiss Federal Tribunal, supra note 60; Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–208 
(West 1996). 
 131. These pressures are partly social and partly professional.  Arbitrators have an incentive to get 
along with each other.  Further, losing parties may be less likely to comply voluntarily with a majority 
award when their party–appointed arbitrator dissented.  For example, the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators, one of the few institutions that maintains a successful program training lawyers in how to 
act as international arbitrators, states explicitly that arbitrators should attempt to decide unanimously.  
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part of their role to explain the perspective of the party that appointed them, 
especially if the other two members of the tribunal come from a legally and 
culturally different background.  The tribunal’s deliberations, therefore, tend toward 
comparative law discussion even where the status of the governing law or the 
parties’ arguments would not require the arbitrators to engage in comparative 
analyses. 
The primary implication of ICA as a crossroads of legal systems is that all 
participants—the parties, their counsel, the arbitrators, as well as others such as 
tribunal secretaries and members of the administering institutions’ secretariats—are 
constantly confronted with different legal systems and with lawyers whose diverse 
perspectives are shaped by the variety of their legal training.  In such a context, 
comparative law methods are arguably the only means by which fair processes and 
effective outcomes can be fashioned in what would otherwise be a tower of babel.132  
The next Subsection explores the consequences of this fact for professional 
competition within the field. 
B.  International Arbitration as a                                                
Competitive Marketplace 
Like any field of professional activity, ICA is defined by the terms of 
competition within the field—for social capital and for the market share it confers.  
Competition persists at every level, between lawyers for clients, between arbitrators 
for appointments, and between arbitral institutions and states for a greater share of 
the overall dispute resolution market.133  As a service industry created by and for 
the international commercial community, ICA must respond to the demands of that 
community for dispute resolution services that are effective (i.e., final and 
enforceable), efficient, flexible, and fair.134  These factors combine to produce the 
quality of legitimacy that is vital for arbitration, as a voluntary system of dispute 
resolution, to maintain its vitality. 
Comparative law provides the means for arbitrators, counsel, and arbitral 
institutions to respond to market demands and confer legitimacy on the system.  The 
first level on which comparative law represents a response to market demands is 
simply the complexity engendered by the mixing of too much law and too little law.  
The pervasiveness of comparative law methods in ICA practice, especially for 
 
International Arbitration Practice Guideline: Drafting Arbitral Awards, CHARTERED INST. OF 
ARBITRATORS 12, https://www.ciarb.org/media/4206/guideline-10-drafting-arbitral-awards-part-i-
general-2016.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). 
 132. Genesis 11:1–9. 
 133. See generally KARTON, supra note 1, at 56–75 (explaining the nature and effects of market 
competition in ICA). 
 134. Of course, commercial parties also have other characteristics they want from a dispute resolution 
system, although these appear to be the most important.  See 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The 
Evolution of International Arbitration, QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON, SCH. OF INT’L ARBITRATION 
3 (2018), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2018-International-Arbitration-
Survey---The-Evolution-of-International-Arbitration-(2).PDF (reporting that enforceability, avoiding 
particular national courts, flexibility, and the ability to select one’s arbitrator are the most valuable 
characteristics of ICA to its users).  See generally Joshua Karton, A Conflict of Interests: Seeking a Way 
Forward on Publication of International Arbitral Awards, 28 ARB. INT’L 447, 458–61 (2012) (exploring 
the characteristics of an ideal dispute resolution system from the point of view of commercial parties, 
and in comparison, with systemic interests in the dispute resolution system’s characteristics). 
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advocacy purposes, means that counsel cannot effectively serve their clients without 
significant comparative expertise.  Lawyers unable to provide such a service will 
find that their practice, like their knowledge itself, fails to cross borders. 
Comparative knowledge is also essential to an individual’s advancement within 
the field, as is the kind of comparative mentality that accompanies cultural 
cosmopolitanism (explored more in the next Subsection).  A career in international 
arbitration is often seen as progressing from graduate education, to practice as a 
junior associate in a business law firm or as counsel in the secretariat of an 
international arbitral institution, to developing one’s clientele and beginning to 
attract appointments as an arbitrator, to being able to sustain work full–time as an 
arbitrator.135  Advancement, therefore, depends heavily on developing social 
networks that can supply referrals and arbitral appointments.  After all, the majority 
of arbitral appointments come from other ICA lawyers, either acting as outside 
counsel for parties selecting party–appointed arbitrators or as leaders in arbitral 
institutions acting as appointing authorities.136  Esteem within the ICA professional 
community is essential. 
Comparative law bona fides are, in turn, essential to garnering that esteem.  
Legal chauvinists will be sidelined both professionally and socially, as will any 
lawyer who simply finds it baffling that legal matters could be approached 
differently elsewhere.  Every ICA practitioner possesses the trick of mind of 
considering any given legal issue from multiple perspectives, seeing the law as just 
one more variable that can be manipulated in the search for a favorable or just 
outcome.  This is the essence of comparative law as an analytic method.  Gaillard, 
always an eager evangelist for the field, suggests that ICA has transformed the field 
of comparative law by providing lucrative jobs for comparativists.137 
It is particularly important for arbitrators, who are, after all, free agents selling 
their services in a competitive market, to show that they can understand and take 
into account the perspectives of parties from varying legal systems.  To gain the 
respect of the parties—and with it voluntary compliance with awards and more 
appointments as an arbitrator—they must be able to demonstrate that they approach 
the case with cross–cultural and cross–legal sensitivity and without home–law bias. 
One of the best ways to do that is to flex one’s comparative law muscles.  For 
example, in a review of the published awards, I found when one party’s home law 
governs the merits of a dispute, tribunals more often than not will take pains to show 
that outcome would not have changed if the other party’s home law had governed.  
Such argumentation is entirely unnecessary in terms of legally justifying the 
decision, but it is helpful in maintaining the goodwill of a losing party.138  
Waincymer, an Australian academic who is active as an arbitrator, said of his own 
 
 135. Of course, not every ICA lawyer wants to follow such a career path.  If nothing else, practice as 
counsel, especially in a multinational firm that employs large teams of associates, is more lucrative than 
arbitrating full time.  Nevertheless, proceeding from counsel to arbitrator is seen as part of the 
conventional cursus honorum in ICA, along with such other markers of success in the field as part–time 
professorships at universities and leadership roles in arbitral institutions and professional associations 
like the International Bar Association, the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, and the 
more U.S.–oriented Institute for Transnational Arbitration. 
 136. See Magdalene D’Silva, Dealing in Power: Gatekeepers in Arbitrator Appointment in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 5 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 605 (2014) (explaining and 
critiquing the “networks of community” that account for most arbitral appointments). 
 137. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 263. 
 138. KARTON, supra note 1, at 139–40. 
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practice: “In the majority of cases where I have sat as an arbitrator, at least one party 
has come from a civilian jurisdiction.  I always want to have the respect of both 
parties that I approach the case without any domestic baggage.”139 
Thus, comparative law provides a means to promote the legitimacy of ICA at 
the level of the individual dispute and, consequently, for the ICA system as a 
whole.140  It is one of the main methods by which ICA counsel and arbitrators attract 
the favor of commercial parties and collectively maintain ICA as a robust system 
of dispute resolution that compares favorably with litigation and with consensual 
methods of dispute resolution like mediation.  Market competition within ICA 
incentivizes practitioners to develop their comparative law expertise.  At the same 
time, competition with other forms of dispute resolution incentivizes ICA 
practitioners as a community to employ comparative law methods in order to ensure 
that the field continues to serve the interests of commercial parties of diverse 
backgrounds, needs, and priorities. 
C.  International Arbitration as a                                             
Cosmopolitan Community 
The market competitive forces described in the previous Subsection mean that, 
to be successful, anyone practicing in ICA must leave behind much of the “bag and 
baggage” of their home jurisdiction.141  Still, comparativism is more than just a 
matter of client service.  ICA is a global professional community that shares a 
coherent professional culture, along with a set of common values.142  Given the 
heterogeneity of the field and its relative youth (and corresponding lack of deeply 
rooted traditions), it is debatable whether ICA possesses a singular or dominant 
professional culture.  At minimum, though, it is undeniable that ICA practitioners 
 
 139. Jeffrey Waincymer, Indep. Arbitration Practitioner, Adjunct Professor of Law, Nat’l Univ. of 
Sing., The Implications of New Procedural and Evidence Soft Law Instruments, Presentation at the 2019 
Taipei Int’l Conference on Arbitration and Mediation (Aug. 15, 2019). 
 140. Similarly, with respect to investment treaty arbitration, a number of commentators have argued 
that a comparative public law approach to the obligations of states under investment treaties will build 
and preserve the legitimacy of the investor–state dispute settlement system in a politically fraught 
environment.  The best–known exponent of this point of view is Schill, who has pursued it across a 
number of publications.  See Stephan W. Schill, Reforming Investor–State Dispute Settlement: A 
(Comparative and International) Constitutional Law Framework, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 649 (2017) 
(arguing, with respect to investment treaty arbitration, that a comparative public law approach to the 
obligations of states under investment treaties will build and preserve the legitimacy of the investor–
state dispute settlement system in a politically fraught environment); see also Stephan W. Schill, 
Developing a Framework for the Legitimacy of International Arbitration, in 18 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 
789 (Albert Jan Van den Berg ed., 2015); Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s 
Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA J. 
INT’L L. 57 (2011); Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law—An 
Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 3 (Stephan. W. 
Schill ed., 2010). 
 141. See Bernardo M. Cremades, Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures: The Role of Interactive 
Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT’L 157, 170 (1999). 
 142. At least, I have described it that way.  See KARTON, supra note 1 at 78–142; see also Stavros 
Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A New Approach to Arbitral 
Decision–Making, 4 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 553 (2013) (arguing that decision–making in ICA is 
shaped by a common set of biases shared across the ICA system and determined by the institutional 
structures of that system). 
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tend to share cosmopolitanism as both a personal characteristic and a set of value 
commitments. 
The term “cosmopolitan” has different meanings in different fields, but all 
definitions share the notion that cosmopolitans see humanity as engaged in a 
common enterprise, despite the diversity of human culture, politics, economics, and 
even biology.143  Here, I use the term in a non–technical sense to describe a set of 
cultural commitments that are collectively globalist and anti–chauvinist but not 
homogenizing, that de–emphasize (or even disparage) national or ethnic identities 
and are accepting of (or even revel in) cultural differences.  Cosmopolitans are the 
kind of people who might describe themselves as “citizens of the world.” 
The ICA professional community is cosmopolitan par excellence.  ICA 
practitioners are often multilingual, trained in multiple legal systems, work outside 
their home jurisdiction for at least part of their careers, and are comfortable working 
day–in–and–day–out with lawyers who possess varied backgrounds.144  Today, 
cosmopolitan credentials of this sort have become an informal requirement for entry 
into the field.  An established, London–based arbitrator who speaks English, 
French, and Russian fluently and has both common law and civil law training 
described that kind of background as indispensable: 
It’s absolutely essential in this field to have, if not languages, certainly the 
cultural awareness at the very, very least. . . .  In the big firms nowadays I 
don’t think they even consider you if you have only one language . . .  I 
think also that my civil law–common law background was invaluable [to 
the firm where I was first hired], although at the time I did not realize it.145 
Law firms with significant ICA practice groups all tout the multinational, 
multilingual, and multijural character of their teams and, correspondingly, their 
ability to represent clients in arbitrations conducted in any language, under any laws 
and rules of procedure, and before arbitrators of any nationality.146  While such 
 
 143. See, e.g., KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS 
xii–xiv (1st ed. 2006). 
 144. See Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
957, 958–59 (2005). 
 145. KARTON, supra note 1, at 136 (interviewees emphasized cross–cultural sensitivity and personal 
cross–cultural experience as crucial to success in ICA, to the point of disparaging practitioners who are 
not equally cosmopolitan). 
 146. See International Arbitration, CLIFFORD CHANCE, https://www.cliffordchance.com/expertise/ser
vices/litigation_dispute_resolution/international_arbitration.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (“We draw 
upon the resources of our global arbitration practice to deploy teams that are adapted to the specific 
requirements of the dispute, in terms both of geographic and industry–specific expertise . . .  We are able 
to run arbitrations in any of the world’s major languages . . .  We conduct arbitrations pursuant to the 
rules and procedures of all the major arbitral institutions.”); see also International Arbitration, WHITE 
& CASE, https://www.whitecase.com/law/practices/international–arbitration (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) 
(bragging that its diversified team, spread among numerous cities around the world, enables it to “cover 
every jurisdiction, arbitral forum and industry sector, and work under multiple laws and in diverse 
languages.”); International Arbitration, CLEARY GOTTLIEB, https://www.clearygottlieb.com/practice-
landing/international-arbitration (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (highlighting its status as the first U.S. firm 
to hire and promote non–U.S. lawyers as equal partners, as a way to emphasize its “global perspective”); 
International Commercial Arbitration, LALIVE, https://www.lalive.law/practices/international-
commercial-arbitration/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (“Our arbitration team is composed of highly talented 
international disputes lawyers qualified in Switzerland and 15 other jurisdictions, with strong academic 
backgrounds and who together speak more than 16 languages and are able to handle proceedings 
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marketing language should be treated for what it is—advertising copy intended to 
sell the firms’ services, rather than to describe an objective reality—it shows that 
the providers of ICA services value (or at least think their clients value) language 
skills, legal diversity, and international experience, the hallmarks of the legal 
cosmopolitan. 
To enter the field, therefore, law students and young lawyers must develop 
cosmopolitan credentials, in particular their comparative legal knowledge.  For 
example, Strong argues that specialized education and training is necessary for 
success in ICA practice, in part because most law schools, at least in the U.S., do 
not provide sufficient training in comparative law.147  Even in Singapore, known as 
a crossroads of East and West, Bell argues that law schools must incorporate more 
comparative law into their curricula in order to maintain Singapore’s place as a hub 
for legal services, especially for ICA.148 
Just as law firms are likely to hire cosmopolitan lawyers into their international 
arbitration groups, and those same lawyers are likely to appoint cosmopolitan 
lawyers as their arbitrators, so too young lawyers with cosmopolitan values are 
likely to be attracted to the field in the first place.  This is not a new phenomenon.  
As Dezalay and Garth note in their pioneering socio–legal study of the international 
arbitration field, the solicitors who were influential in developing international 
arbitration in England, beginning in the 1960s, were drawn to what was then seen 
as a continental European field “because of their own cosmopolitan, hybrid 
backgrounds . . .  [T]hey were born or had been educated abroad, including 
especially German immigrants; or they had foreign, typically French, spouses.”149 
Comparativism is the legal expression of cosmopolitanism.150  Unlike 
globalists, cosmopolitans do not homogenize, but rather celebrate difference.  They 
do not seek to remake the global order, but rather to improve it through application 
of technical expertise and cultural sensitivity.151  The same is true of comparative 
law.  In contrast to the often–revolutionary aims of international law, comparative 
law crosses borders but does not try to erase them.  Describing the divergent values, 
goals, and professional cultures of comparative law and international law, Kennedy 
 
involving a broad range of substantive laws, arbitration laws and arbitration rules all around the world.  
This diversity and international reach are the key components of the firm’s DNA as a disputes 
powerhouse.”). 
 147. See Strong, supra note 68, at 126 (“The skills and knowledge gap in international commercial 
arbitration is exacerbated by the fact that legal education programs often fail to provide information on 
any type of international and comparative legal research, let alone address the specialized needs of 
international arbitration.”). 
 148. See Gary F. Bell, Teaching More Civil Law at the National University of Singapore: A Necessity 
for Singapore as a legal Hub for Asia, 2019 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 5 (arguing that “Singapore cannot 
become a serious legal hub for the region that includes so many civil law jurisdictions unless it is able  
to handle civil law matters.”). 
 149. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 27, at 136. 
 150. William Twining, Implications of ‘Globalisation’ for Law as a Discipline, in 3 LEGAL THEORY & 
THE LEGAL ACADEMY 129, 146 (Maksymilian Del Mar, Williams Twining, & Michael Giudice eds., 
2010) (“How can one seriously claim to be a universalist, if one is ethnocentrically unaware of the ideas 
and values of other belief systems and traditions?”). 
 151. See Horacio A. Grigera Naon, The Role of International Commercial Arbitration, 65 ARB. 266, 
267 (1999) (“Though cultural openness may lead to legal solutions based on a blend of the different 
cultural identities at stake resulting from a comparative law analysis, such exercise also implies 
recognising that in the present world, cultural differences and respect for cultural ‘otherness’ is a value 
in itself, and that uniformity may not be advanced without due respect for such factors.”). 
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associates cosmopolitanism with the former and globalism with the latter.152  
Indeed, Kennedy’s list of the kinds of professional activities typically engaged in 
by comparativists reads like a list of the activities engaged in by ICA practitioners: 
[E]laborating rules, manning institutions devoted to the restatement and 
reform of private law rules, developing a scholarly consensus on the most 
reasonable or workable rules, resolving disputes through arbitration or the 
provision of legal opinions, advising legislators in the periphery on how 
such matters are handled in the most advanced economies[,] or advising at 
the center on the applicability of common commercial rules in peripheral 
settings.153 
In this way, the cosmopolitan ethos, operationalized through comparative law 
methods, can be seen as fundamental not only to ICA practice but to the 
construction of the field’s identity.  The cosmopolitan character of the ICA 
profession is maintained by a three–legged stool of self–selection, professional 
acculturation, and economic incentives. 
D.  Corroboration from a Recent                                                    
Empirical Study 
In November 2018, together with a collaborator, Tony Cole, I conducted a 
series of individual and group interviews in Egypt, encountering a total of twenty–
seven Egyptian international arbitration practitioners.  These interviews were part 
of the pilot for a large–scale, socio–legal exploration of the international arbitration 
profession across fifty–three countries in Europe and central Asia, which is now in 
its data–collection phase.154  The interviewees are not necessarily representative of 
the whole Egyptian ICA bar (although attempts were made to reach a representative 
sample), and the reporting of the qualitative data here is brief and illustrative.  It is 
not intended to “prove” anything, but only to show that the claims made in the 
previous Sections can be empirically corroborated, limited though the available data 
may be for the time being. 
The interviews were semi–structured and explored a range of issues related to 
the practice of international arbitration in Egypt and by Egyptian lawyers.  
Interviewees were guaranteed anonymity so that they could speak without fear of 
professional repercussions.  Thus, they remain unidentified here, with only the 
occasional addition of background information necessary to contextualize their 
remarks.  Of particular interest are the biographical characteristics of the Egyptian 
 
 152. See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International 
Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 554–606 (1997) (“Common to all these comparativisms, of both 
expertise and erudition, is a stance which we might term ‘cosmopolitanism’ . . .  For the cosmopolitan, 
values are universal and humanist, projects rational and pragmatic, knowledge—of the self as of the 
other—good for its own sake.”). 
 153. Id. at 622–23. 
 154. Anthony N. Cole & Joshua D. Karton, The Social & Psychological Underpinnings of Commercial 
Arbitration in Europe, U.K. RESEARCH & INNOVATION, https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FR0056
64%2F1 (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) (made possible by a grant from the U.K. Economic and Social 
Research Council.  ESRC Research Grant No. ES/R005664/1). 
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international arbitration community, their attitudes toward the comparative law 
aspects of ICA practice, and their degree of cosmopolitanism more generally. 
The interviews were conducted in English, and it is telling that every 
interviewee spoke English with fluency and comfort, on topics of both casual 
conversation and technical legal discourse, despite the fact that for all of them, 
English is a second or third language.155  Moreover, every single interviewee had 
been trained in the law of at least one jurisdiction other than Egypt, most commonly 
France.156  Nearly all interviewees expressed their conviction that training in 
multiple systems, in particular exposure to common law, is essential for entry into 
the field and advancement within it.157  One interviewee, who himself holds a 
doctorate from an American law school, related that “people are obsessed with 
having a foreign law degree.” 
Aside from formal multi–system training per se, most interviewees stressed the 
importance of being able to work across multiple legal systems.  As part of the 
interviews, we posed various hypothetical but realistic scenarios, prompting 
interviewees to explain how they would act if they encountered the situations 
described.  Almost without fail, interviewees began by stating that their actions 
would depend in the first instance on the governing law or applicable rules, and 
moreover on whether the relevant provisions were mandatory or derogable.  Often, 
they then went on to describe, with some specificity, how they would act under 
different legal contexts. 
Several interviewees cited the opportunity to work in and learn about multiple 
laws as an appealing aspect of ICA practice.  One young female law firm associate 
was attracted to ICA practice by what she described as the “openness” of the rules, 
which “allows you to create, to work with the law, to create arguments, to be 
creative.”  A more senior interviewee, who heads a dedicated international 
arbitration team at a leading business firm, stressed that inter–cultural 
communication was a cornerstone of his career: “[t]he ability to understand, and 
accept, and embrace the fact that others may do things differently and in a proper 
and right way as well.” 
The interviews show the Egyptian ICA community to be highly cosmopolitan.  
ICA practitioners are multilingual and often trained in both civil law and common 
law.  At a minimum, the practitioners are comfortable with legal diversity.158  They 
embrace comparative law methods and perspectives and display significant 
comparative law expertise.  They see ICA as a field of practice in which legal and 
social cosmopolitanism is not just a professional advantage, but a prerequisite both 
 
 155. According to interviewee, and Egyptian international arbitration practitioner, most of the major 
ICA cases in Egypt are conducted in English, and a lack of English language skills excludes most of the 
Egyptian bar from succeeding in ICA, regardless of their other virtues (Nov. 2018). 
 156. Several had attended, for their initial legal training, a dual–degree program in Egyptian and French 
law offered by Cairo University’s Institute of International Law in collaboration with Paris–Sorbonne 
University (since 2018, a constituent part of what is now called Sorbonne University).  The next–most–
common foreign laws in which interviewees had been trained were, perhaps unsurprisingly, English and 
American. 
 157. For example, one interviewee observed that “most of the international firms are hiring the common 
law qualified practitioners.”  Another noted that her law firm “leaned more towards [hiring] younger 
people that are . . . more open towards crossing boundaries and being different.” 
 158. In other parts of the interviews not described here, interviewees also displayed high levels of 
comfort with cultural diversity and—at least to the foreign interviewers probing their views—comfort 
with gender equality.   
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for admission to the field and progress within it.  In short, Egyptian ICA 
practitioners display pervasive comparativism as a function of the nature of their 
daily work, as a response to market incentives, and as a personal value.  
Cosmopolitans are attracted to the field and find themselves encouraged to develop 
that cosmopolitanism professionally, as expressed through comparative law. 
E.  Inherent and Integral Comparativism 
While a doctrinal analysis can explain what is happening in ICA—it 
demonstrates the pervasiveness of comparative law methods—a socio–legal 
analysis that puts ICA into its professional context can help explain why 
comparativism is so pervasive.  Attention to the professional context of ICA 
practice shows that, even if there were not too much law in some areas and too little 
in others, comparativism would still be prevalent due to the structural features of 
the ICA system, the forms market competition takes in ICA, and the values of the 
field.  At the same time, those with a cosmopolitan mindset are attracted to ICA and 
seek to join its ranks and to progress along its cursus honorum to garner 
appointments as arbitrators, in large part through developing and displaying their 
comparative law expertise.  Operating through self–selection, acculturation, and 
market pressures, comparativism is inherent to the professional context within 
which arbitration practitioners work. 
V.  CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD                                                                
AND OUTWARD 
Taking these strands together, one can see that comparative law methods are 
necessary and desirable at nearly every stage of international arbitral proceedings.  
Comparative law is a source of inspiration, of legitimacy, and of substantive and 
procedural law.159  It is simply unavoidable—not that ICA practitioners would want 
to avoid it.  The field attracts cosmopolitan practitioners with a comparative 
mindset, enshrines that mindset at the heart of its training and professional 
acculturation processes, and reinforces it through the terms of market competition 
for appointments as counsel and arbitrator.  Comparative analysis can be found not 
just at each stage of the proceedings, but also in the professional culture of the field.  
ICA is comparative law operationalized case–by–case: comparative law in action. 
Thinking about ICA in this way suggests two sets of potential implications, offered 
here speculatively and as an invitation to further research. 
The first set of implications is for the comparative study of law.  Comparative 
law is often taken as kind of a sterile and esoteric subject, a matter for academics 
and sometimes legislatures, but not for practicing lawyers.  ICA in particular, and 
modern transnational legal practice more generally, shows that comparative law is 
a living discipline, one that is used by lawyers to win cases like any other source of 
legal authority or form of legal argument.  Education in law schools and 
professional formation in law firms should reflect that reality.  Indeed, given the 
increasing penetration of international law into domestic realms and the blurring of 
 
 159. Gaillard, supra note 111, at 376. 
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lines between the two, comparative law knowledge and skills will only become 
more relevant with time, even to lawyers whose practices never cross borders. 
Similarly, ICA shows that comparative law as an academic discipline is 
overdue for a re–conceptualization.  Comparative law has an enduring identity 
crisis: it is not itself a field of law, but equally it is not a theory of law or a legal 
research method.  Where, then, does comparative law fit in the universe of legal 
thought?  ICA provides an answer, or at least part of one; it reveals comparative law 
to be a practice skill, a form of legal reasoning that can be employed in drafting (of 
legislation, contracts, court rules, etc.), negotiation, advocacy, and decision–
making. 
The second set of implications is for the development of law at the transnational 
level.  The experience of ICA is that decentralized, accretive developments have 
yielded widely–accepted global standards, mixing common law and civil law 
elements, with an increasing influence of Asian, especially Chinese, legal traditions.  
This has been true even of procedural law, which has shown itself to be especially 
difficult to harmonize, at least outside the arbitration context.160 
Thus, ICA as comparative law in action furthers legal harmonization, one of 
the traditional uses for comparative law.161  But in ICA, that harmonization develops 
organically, reactively, and accretively through individual cases, the advocacy of 
counsel, and the decisions of arbitrators, without the need for multi–year drafting 
conferences, grand codifications, or legal transplants.162  Indeed, since ICA is not a 
legal system unto itself, there is no receptacle into which laws may be transplanted.  
But the law nevertheless evolves through a constant comparative process.  The 
overall drive is toward harmonization, but the end result is not a homogeneous 
global order.  Instead, the market–driven logic of ICA—the need to serve an 
enormously diverse pool of commercial parties—means that ICA will reflect the 
pluralism of its users.163 
Fan describes the resulting dynamic tension using the evocative term 
“glocalization,” which she defines as “the entanglement process between ‘global 
standards’ and ‘local norms.’”164  Fan writes: 
On the one hand, global norms are localized with adaptations to accord 
more closely with local cultures—‘localized globalism.’  On the other 
hand, through interactions with different cultures, local practices may 
produce shared norms and expectations, and eventually form a common 
 
 160. Ingeborg Schwenzer & Lina Ali, The Emergence of Global Standards in Private Law, 18 VIND. 
J. INT’L COMM. L. & ARB. 93, 102–03 (2014). 
 161. Basedow, supra note 82, at 849–51 (describing unification agencies’ position as one of the primary 
consumers of comparative law research). 
 162. Halil Rahman Basaran, Identifying International Commercial Arbitration, 22 INT’L TRADE L. 
REV. 91, 91 (2016) (“ICA may be deemed a dialogue between parties to a dispute and the relevant 
arbitrators. . . .  That is to say, ICA is dynamic and consists of re–descriptions of international commerce 
through dialogue.”). 
 163. Bell expresses a similar sentiment, tying the preservation of a range of options in ICA to the field’s 
respect for party autonomy: “To some extent, shouldn’t international commercial arbitration be more 
about legal pluralism than the harmonisation of laws?  If we believe in party autonomy, we must give 
the parties real choices, which means that not everything should be harmonised and that comparative 
law should continue to play a key role in international arbitration.”  Bell, supra note 43, at 12. 
 164. Kun Fan, “Glocalization” of International Arbitration—Rethinking Tradition: Modernity and 
East–West Binaries Through Examples of China and Japan, 11 U. PENN. ASIAN L. REV. 243, 252 (2016). 
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culture—‘globalized localism.’  The future of international arbitration will 
continue to be influenced by the combined forces of globalism and 
localism.165 
Indeed, glocalization represents the likely future of transnational law generally.  
More and more areas of transnational law will be harmonized through a continual 
process of comparison and hybridization.  At the same time, a durable, desirable 
diversity will remain in a variety of areas, in order to preserve the autonomy of 
individuals to choose legal solutions that suit their particular circumstances.166 
To extend the biological metaphor, instead of a transplant, ICA is recombinant 
DNA—a genetically modified organism in which different elements are constantly 
borrowed, mixed, hybridized, and evolved into new forms.167  Comparative law in 




























 165. Id. at 290. 
 166. Such “convergence” accompanied by “informed divergence” is visible in many areas of 
globalization.  These terms were coined and elucidated by Anne–Marie Slaughter in ANNE–MARIE 
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (giving a detailed account of global politics in 
transformation).  For a similar point made in a more specifically legal context, see H. PATRICK GLENN, 
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 378 (4th ed. 2010) (referring to “sustainable diversity” among 
disparate legal traditions). 
 167. Horacio A. Grigera Naon, supra note 151, at 267 (“The solutions reached by international 
commercial arbitral tribunals, both at the substantive and procedural law levels, are not necessarily a 
cultural blend but the outcome of a harmonic combination of elements originating from different cultural 
sources.”). 
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